Creating a Business-Friendly Climate by Nika Gilauri
CHAPTER 4
Creating a Business-Friendly Climate
Abstract This chapter describes the beneﬁts of the hub economy and tells
the story of how Georgia became a hub for regional trade thanks to
simpliﬁed rules and smart regulations. As its centerpiece, this chapter
presents an account of successful Georgian reforms in “Doing Business”
areas recognized by the World Bank, such as Georgia jumping from 112th
place in 2006 the 8th place in 2014, as well as Georgia being named as the
top reformer worldwide for the period of 2006–2011. The chapter pro-
vides a ﬁrst-hand account of how the government changed the mindset of
public ofﬁcials with the introduction of the “one government” principle
and rules such as “silence is consent.” It concludes with a discussion of the
World Bank’s ranking methodology and a case example from Kazakhstan,
a country that has applied many of the lessons learned in Georgia to create
its own road map for reform in 2015–2016.
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4.1 THE HUB ECONOMY
Georgia is not particularly rich in natural resources. The country is not an
oil exporter, and it doesn’t mine diamonds or precious metals (except for
relatively small amounts of gold). Georgia has always had a high current
account deﬁcit, and an inﬂow of foreign capital has always been vital
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to sustain the country’s economy. In the early 2000s, Georgia was a poor
country. It is still not a rich country − a lower-middle economy according
to the World Bank classiﬁcation.1 But back then, Georgia was among the
poorest countries in the world. There were only two prospective sources
of substantial growth: local entrepreneurial activity and foreign direct
investment.
At the time, in the early 2000s, attracting foreign investment seemed,
to put it mildly, challenging. Georgia had a recent history of civil wars,
a high criminal rate, and a high level of corruption. The geopolitical
situation was not exactly stable; the danger of forcible Russian interfer-
ence was always looming in the background. On top of all this, the total
size of the prize was comparatively small, given Georgia’s population of
just over four million people and nominal GDP per capita below USD
1000. So why would any investor want to do business in Georgia? Other
countries in the region were much more attractive: oil-rich Azerbaijan;
Turkey, a newly emerged huge market with a very vibrant economy;
Eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania, which
were already members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and would soon become members of the European Union.2 And still
Georgia grew faster than most of its neighbors between 2004 and 2012,3
and this growth came from foreign investment. Unlikely as it sounds,
Georgia found its niche as an attractive environment for private enter-
prise and foreign investment.
The successful ﬁght against corruption as described in earlier chapters
was the most important driver of economic growth. Additionally, the
government went to great lengths to create a business-friendly
environment – by increasing transparency, reducing the administrative
burden for private companies; providing opportunities for entrepreneurial
activity; and demonstrating to foreign investors that Georgia was more
attractive than its neighbors in terms of regulation, taxation, and business
climate. All rules and regulations were reviewed from the point of view of
the private sector: what were the obstacles for entrepreneurs? What reg-
ulatory problems did investors face? In the ﬁrst two years after the Rose
Revolution, 2004 and 2005, the plan was to liberalize the economy and
create a business-friendly environment to attract investment. In 2009 and
2010, these efforts became part of the more comprehensive vision to create
a “hub economy.” Transforming Georgia as a regional hub for investment,
trade, transit, tourism, and education would bring the next wave of
growth.
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Hubs typically grow faster than their neighbors and manage to develop
a more diversiﬁed economy that makes them less susceptible to recession
than other countries. Their economies are resilient, i.e., less likely to be hit
by an economic downturn, and they recover faster than other countries.
But location is not enough to qualify as a hub. Governments need to make
a real and sustained effort to create a business-friendly environment to take
advantage of the beneﬁts of the hub economy.
The main characteristics of the hub economy are:
• A geographical location that makes a country a gateway for other
countries.
• An open economy that allows for free trade with most of the region.
• A well-developed transportation infrastructure.
• A low level of corruption.
• An attractive business environment, including low taxation.
Around the world many countries qualify as potential hubs because of
their location and geopolitical position. Some of these countries have
already realized this potential as a result of purposeful transformations to
acquire the characteristics listed previously. Examples of countries that
have taken advantage of their location and transformed themselves into
regional, or even global, hubs include Singapore and Hong Kong. Many
countries are still in the process of transformation.
Georgia is a good example of how a country can start a transformation
into a regional hub. In 2010, Georgia’s geographical location and natural
resources were the same as in the late 1990s. Its geopolitical position was,
perhaps, evenweaker than it had been before. But economically, the tide had
turned. Within a decade, Georgia had transformed itself from a failed state
that was close to bankruptcy into a fast-growing, extremely resilient econ-
omy. Despite the double blow of the world ﬁnancial crisis and the Russian
invasion, Georgia’s economy grew at a rate of 6.7 percent annually over the
period from 2003 to 2012 (CAGR). Georgia suffered less from the reces-
sion, and recovered more quickly, than any other country in the region.
All this wasn’t due to a stroke of good luck. It was the result of the
government’s dedicated efforts to remake Georgia as a hub. By 2010,
Georgia had successfully fought corruption, invested in infrastructure, put
in place free trade agreements with all neighboring countries, and signiﬁ-
cantly improved its business environment. It had turned its geographical
position into a source of economic advantage and re-invented itself as a hub.
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The beneﬁt of the hub economy becomes most apparent when you
look at the development of Georgian exports. In 2004, the most exported
type of product was scrap metal, accounting for approximately 16 percent
of all exports. In 2010, vehicles topped the list of Georgia’s exports −
although Georgia had never produced, or even assembled, any vehicles.
Rather, the change was driven by simpliﬁed rules and regulations, a
decrease in corruption, and investments in transportation infrastructure
(see the discussion of tax and customs reforms in the next chapter).
Because of these improvements, car dealers gladly chose Georgia’s open
economy as their regional trade center. In Georgia, it was faster and
cheaper to import a vehicle, obtain customs clearance, register the vehicle
to a buyer, and then re-export it to any other country in the region. Car
dealers from almost all over the world brought to Georgia cars destined for
the whole region. Azeri, Arminian, and Kazakh car dealers then bought
and resold these cars to buyers in their respective countries. Dealers of the
used cars followed suit. Before long, Georgia had turned into the regional
center for vehicle trading.4 Tens of thousands of jobs were created, and
Georgia’s current account deﬁcit was reduced – not by building new
factories or new industrial zones but by smart regulations and simple rules.
4.2 GEORGIA’S “DOING BUSINESS” REFORMS
The beneﬁts of the hub economy are contingent on a business-friendly
environment. Georgia’s transformation into a business-friendly country
started in 2005. The World Bank had just published its ﬁrst “Ease of
Doing Business” report, but our government was still busy getting its
house in order after the Rose Revolution. Fighting corruption in govern-
ment agencies and state-owned enterprises was our top priority at the time.
While we were determined to improve Georgia’s business climate, the
“Doing Business” rating itself was on the margins of our attention at best.
Imagine our surprise when the World Bank contacted us in the fall of
2007 with the news that, thanks to reforms initiated in 2004, Georgia had
jumped from 112th to 37th place in the “Doing Business” rating. Because
of the magnitude of this improvement, Simeon Djankov, chief economist
of the ﬁnance and private sector vice-presidency of the World Bank,
personally came all the way to Georgia from Washington, D.C. Simeon
commended Georgia on its unprecedented success.5 We thanked him and
said that we aspired to break into the top 20. Although he was an admirer
of Georgia, Simeon was skeptical. Much to his – and lot of other
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observers’ – surprise, Georgia went on to not only make the top 20, but
even the top 10. In 2014, Georgia was ranked 8th. Out of the 10 topics
covered by the “Doing Business” Report, Georgia excelled in 5 categories:
• Starting a business
• Registering property
• Dealing with construction permits
• Labor regulations
• Getting credit
In 2011, Georgia was nominated as the number one reformer worldwide
for the period from 2006 to 2011. According to the World Bank, no other
country has made as many reforms as Georgia to make doing business
easier. Although Georgia has since lost its peak ranking, it remains one of
the most attractive countries to do business in globally.
So how was it done? How do you move from 112th place to 37th in one
year, and from 112th to 8th in less than a decade? You start by introducing
the kinds of reforms most civil servants will tell you are “impossible.” For
example, we abolished the vast majority – about 85 percent – of all pre-
existing licenses and permits during the ﬁrst wave of our efforts to improve
the business climate between 2004 and 2006. The impact of these and
similar changes was not limited to the “Doing Business” ranking. Rather,
the ranking reﬂected substantial improvements that made a big and tangible
difference in the real world. For example, as a direct effect of our reforms,
construction in Georgia veritably skyrocketed between 2004 and 2006. The
share of construction as a percentage of GDP grew from 6.4 percent in 2004
to 9.0 percent in 2006. Over the course of the same period, the square
footage approved for development in Tbilisi increased almost ﬁvefold, from
423,000m2 in 2004 to 2,175,000m2 in 2006. Land registration saw similar
growth rates in these years.
Heartened by such early successes and the World Bank’s recognition,
the government launched the second and third stages of its reforms to
make Georgia more business friendly. We listened to the concerns
of private sector players, big and small, and reﬁned many regulations
accordingly. Examples of such smart, business-friendly regulatory princi-
ples, all but one of which were applied successfully in Georgia, include:
1. One government principle
2. Silence is consent
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3. Fee-based service delivery
4. Ex ante vs. ex post licensing
5. Regulatory guillotine
6. Piggybacking
7. Sunset clause approach
The biggest challenge we faced was to change the mindset of govern-
ment employees. Every time we – as the new government – tried to
introduce an innovative approach, improve the service to the public,
simplify the rules, or streamline procedures, we hit a wall of resistance
from the very people who worked for us, especially from middle man-
agers in government agencies and other public institutions. “This is how
we have always done it,” “What you are suggesting is impossible,” and
“What about public safety?” were their top three retorts. As if public
safety was a function of the number of licenses people had to apply for, or
the hours they spent standing in line to get a permit! Many reforms were
initially delayed by such objections from bureaucrats. They had no
reason to welcome any changes. The more permits people had to apply
for, and the longer they had to wait to get them, the bigger the oppor-
tunity for extortion. What better place is there to solicit a bribe for
expedited service than a really long line of frustrated applicants? The
old-school bureaucrats didn’t care that these practices gave the public
service as a whole a bad name. They had nothing to gain or lose from the
public image of the government. All they cared about was protecting
their income and their inﬂuence.
After many discussions, we came up with two overarching principles
that helped change the mindset of middle managers in the public service
to an astonishing degree: the one government principle and the rule that
silence is consent. We made it clear that the state would only succeed or
fail as a whole, and that those who were a part of the problem would be
ﬁred, while those who made an effort to become part of the solution
would be rewarded and rise through the ranks. The “silence is consent”
rule creates incentives for public servants to simplify bureaucratic pro-
cesses, as described later in the text. As these principles gained traction,
public servants started approaching members of the government with
their own ideas for simpliﬁcation and improved government services.
They had always known which rules were redundant or unnecessarily
complex, but they had had no motivation to do anything about it.
Reducing or simplifying regulation would have implied reducing their
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illicit gains. The new rules gave them an incentive to break their habit of
self-serving obstruction, and that’s why things started to change. The
reform of rules and regulations went hand in hand with a reform of the
civil service itself. This was an important factor in bringing about a
mindset change among civil servants. While the number of civil servants
was reduced, the salaries of those who remained increased by a factor of
ten or more. As a result, the face of the civil service had changed when
the second and third stages of our reforms took effect. It was now a much
more qualiﬁed, and much more fairly paid, group of people than it had
ever been before.
4.2.1 One Government Principle
Nothing is as frustrating for a citizen or an entrepreneur as having to deal
with multiple government agencies, and juggle multiple documents and
certiﬁcates, to get a simple thing done. For example, to register a new
company before 2004, the founder had to get registered at the depart-
ment of statistics and at the tax department, obtain a clean criminal
record for the director and owners of the company from the Ministry
of the Interior, get an ofﬁcial stamp, get a court order, and so on. Today,
registering a new business in Georgia only takes a few minutes, and the
registrar will supply the founder with all necessary information, including
a bank account number for the new company. We call this the “one
government” principle: “A government agency cannot request from a
citizen any documents, or any additional information, which is the
responsibility of another government agency.” The population perceives
the government as one entity, and most people don’t understand why
one government agency would require them to provide it with a stamped
paper issued by another government agency. And they are right. Why
should a private citizen do the job of the government? In response,
Georgia has adapted the one-stop-shop principle for the public admin-
istration. Citizens now have to deal with one entity only to obtain any
kind of service from the government.
And while many governments have adopted similar one-stop-shopping
approaches, sometimes in the shape of single, all-purpose service windows at
border crossings or government agencies,6 Georgia has gone further. We
built large public service halls in all major cities, which gather almost all
services the government provides to citizens and businesses under one roof.
The portfolio includes more than 400 different types of service. You can go
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there to obtain a birth certiﬁcate, pick up a passport, or register a company.
The average waiting time is less than three minutes, and the average time it
takes to complete a given service is ﬁve to six minutes. Services are provided
to citizens by specially trained professionals from the ofﬁce of the govern-
ment, while the actual administrative work is handled by specialists at the
respective ministries, departments, and agencies in back ofﬁces. The concept
was immediately easy on citizens, but initially hard on ofﬁcials. They had to
give up part of their previous power, and it took a lot of behind-the-scenes
coordination to make it work, but the impact was overwhelmingly positive.
In a 2010 report, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) ranked Georgia as the number one country when it comes to
ofﬁcial document delivery. And according to a 2012 World Bank survey,
92 percent of citizens were satisﬁed with how Georgia’s public sector issues
documents. This was one of the most popular reforms of all, and it helped
bring the government the political credit that it needed to introduce
further, partly unpopular reforms.
4.2.2 Silence Is Consent
Prior to 2006, government agencies took two to three months to answer
even a simple query. Applying for a permit, e.g., to build a house or a
commercial building, would result in a waiting time of six to nine months.
Agencies came up with irrelevant inquiries, or requests for additional
information, simply to stall the process. As an applicant, you had no way
of knowing whether the approval process was in progress at all, let alone
when to expect a deﬁnitive answer. In fact, the system was deliberately
designed to elicit bribes from applicants: if you paid a bribe, your applica-
tion would be expedited. People were frustrated, and many stopped
applying for permits and licenses altogether. The country as a whole paid
the price for these practices, simply because so much entrepreneurial
energy went to waste and much of the economic activity was conducted
in the shadows. In 2007, we introduced a 30-day deadline for all license
applications (20 days for permits). If you apply for a license now and don’t
hear back from the government within 30 days, the application is con-
sidered approved for all intents and purposes.
In practice, making the “silence is consent” principle work smoothly
requires some administrative precautions:
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• In many cases, an applicant still needs some sort of certiﬁcate or
signed paper for the record. So even if the applicant is entitled to
assume an afﬁrmative answer after the deadline expires, they will still
lack the corresponding documentation. To ﬁx this, you need some
sort of high-level authority that is entitled to issue the documenta-
tion in question. In Georgia, such an authority was not created. As a
result, these incidents are handled by the courts, which have the
power to force the respective agency to issue proper documentation
with the required approval, although this power has never been
exercised to date.
• Agencies still tend to come up with all sorts of irrelevant inquiries and
questions to justify an extension of the deadline. This tendency
undermines the entire “silence is consent” concept and lets the old
regime of constant delays creep back in. We introduced speciﬁc
regulation to keep such delays at bay. When an agency asks for
additional information, which it is entitled to do only once according
to the new rules, the clock restarts as soon as the missing information
is supplied by the applicant.
Thanks to “one government” and “silence is consent,” civil servants now
think differently about how they provide services to the public. In the past,
civil servants did not care how many different types of documents an
applicant, be it a citizen or a company, had to submit to obtain a given
license or permit, nor did they care how many different agencies the
applicant had to deal with for a single application. After the reform, things
changed. As one-stop service providers, civil servants were now responsi-
ble for collecting all required documents themselves, and inaction would
lead to automatic approval of an application. Suddenly, ofﬁcials personally
felt the pain of unnecessarily complex rules and regulations. Initially, they
were still reluctant to introduce simpliﬁcations that would make one of
their colleagues redundant, or simply reduce someone’s perceived or
actual authority and importance. But the new regulations (“silence is
consent” and “one government” principle), put together, made it clear
that their own job security was contingent on their contribution to a more
efﬁcient administration. Once civil servants realized that the role of gov-
ernment had changed, and that they could be ﬁred if they didn’t play
along, they started looking at rules and regulations from a new angle.
Before, ofﬁcials treated citizens as petitioners. Now, the customer is king.
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4.2.3 Fee-Based Service Delivery
Improving the quality and the efﬁciency of services provided to the public,
as well as the attitude of those providing the services, is one of the most
important objectives that any government can set out to achieve. This is so
important because all citizens eventually have to deal with a government
agency, because citizens pay for the salaries of civil servants through their
taxes and because the government has a monopoly on many services. A
citizen cannot turn to a private company, after all, to get a passport or
register a business. A government that manages to have its agencies
provide such services in a reliable, fast, and courteous manner will be
richly rewarded with the gratitude and the future favor of the electorate.
In the late 1990s, people stood in line for hours, sometimes for days, at
Georgia’s government agencies to get a passport, register property, or
register a business. In fact, civil servants purposefully made sure that
waiting times were long and frustrating to elicit bribes from applicants
who wanted – or needed – to skip the line. For so-called “commercial
clients,” it made all the sense in the world to pay these bribes, rather than
to leave their businesses unattended while they stood in line. In our ﬁght
against corruption, we increased the salaries of civil servants, recruited new
people, and re-organized the way agencies provided services to citizens
(see above for details). But of course, sometimes lines would form never-
theless, and there was still demand for extra-fast services.
Before corrupt practices could take root again, we simply decided to
legalize the system of charging money for expedited service. What once
was a bribe would now be an ofﬁcial fee. The basic service, whatever it
was, would be free or carry only a small fee to cover the cost. For
example, obtaining a new passport would normally take two weeks and
cost only what it took to produce and deliver the document. But if you
needed it faster, you would have to pay an extra fee – the faster, the
costlier, e.g., USD 100 for delivery within 24 hours and USD 250 for
delivery within one hour. As a general rule, however, the basic service
itself had to be reasonably fast and free (or adequately priced), and
only those who needed accelerated service would pay an extra fee. This
was to avoid a scenario in which civil servants charged everyone the
extra fee.
As an additional incentive for civil servants to act in a customer-friendly
fashion, the extra fees for faster service partially went to the bonuses for the
employees of the agency providing the service. This was the only exception
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to the “one budget” principle discussed previously. It applied only to
agencies that had direct interaction with the public, and it helped increase
the service orientation of these agencies.
4.2.4 Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Licensing
Traditionally, you have to apply for a license before you can start a business
(ex ante), e.g., to open a restaurant. At the same time, you have to get your
ducks in a row as an entrepreneur – secure ﬁnancing, enter into contracts
with suppliers, buy equipment, hire staff, get insurance, and so on. Now
assume the license is denied. All your efforts will have been in vain, and you
will never be able to recover your upfront investment. Your future as a
restaurateur is contingent on a check-up by the respective regulator before
you earn your ﬁrst dollar. In many cases, the inspector will not show up for
days, or even weeks, while you pace the dining area like a cat on a hot tin
roof. And when the inspector ﬁnally comes by, the opening may be further
delayed because of some minor issue that you could well have taken care
of during operations, such as installing air conditioning or adding a second
restroom. The same inspector will return after the opening, typically once a
year, but subsequent inspections will not be as meticulous as the ﬁrst one.
Now imagine you didn’t need a license at all, or − if you did need it −
could apply for it while you were already serving guests at your new
restaurant and generating revenue. Why shouldn’t it be that way? In
fact, I believe that most businesses do not need any licensing. Why should
a small retail shop, or a hairdresser, have to apply for a license at all? Of
course, there are some exceptions, especially in areas that concern the
health and safety of the public. But even in most of those cases, I believe
that licensing could happen in parallel to operations (ex post). As a restau-
rateur, you could open your restaurant whenever you were ready. You
would have to expect an inspector to come by any time, though, to make
sure you adhere to all applicable health and safety regulations. You would
not forego any revenue (especially during the ﬁrst months of operations
when the initially generated revenue is so important for an entrepreneur)
because of delays prior to the opening, and you would be motivated to
take extra care to serve only fresh food, keep the place clean, provide
impeccable service, and only employ staff that have the proper papers −
because there is no telling when there might be an inspection. The most
important aspect of switching from ex ante to ex post licensing is the
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reduced bargaining power of the inspector. When it is up to an inspector
to decide whether or not to allow a newly built (or renovated) commercial
entity to operate, the inspector has signiﬁcant power over the entrepreneur
and is in a position to request a bribe or make other unreasonable requests.
But once a commercial entity is operational, it becomes more difﬁcult to
close it down based on bogus claims.
Critics say that, in an ex post environment, a guest at a restaurant might
suffer from food poisoning before the ﬁrst inspection takes place. But who
says that this couldn’t happen in an ex ante environment, despite the pre-
opening inspection? A restaurant that is spotless today might still serve
spoilt food tomorrow. There is no such thing as 100 percent safety, not
even with ex ante licensing. In fact, our experience in Georgia indicates
that ex post licensing is more effective for driving compliance with applic-
able regulation than ex ante licensing. In an ex ante environment, compa-
nies often let things slide once they have gone through the initial
inspection. In an ex post environment, companies are always on their
guard because an inspector could show up at any time.
4.2.5 Piggybacking
In many developing countries, consumer protection and public safety are
used as pretexts to create artiﬁcial oligopolies and ﬁll the pockets of a few at
the expense of the economy as a whole. These effects were in evidence in
Georgia’s pharmaceutical industry before the reform of the regulation that
governs the introduction of new drugs. The approval process for new drugs
was so costly, and so complex, that only three companies were able to
shoulder the ﬁnancial burden in most cases. The sales of these three com-
panies accounted for about three-quarters of all drug sales in Georgia.7
To help reduce the threshold for smaller players and increase competi-
tion, Georgia decided to take advantage of the expertise developed − and
the experience gathered − elsewhere in the world, i.e., to piggyback on
other countries’ institutions, instead of trying to re-invent the wheel. The
pharmaceutical industry is well suited to piggybacking since many regula-
tory requirements are essentially the same, or very similar, in all countries,
regardless of regional differences.
Before the introduction of piggybacking, new drugs had to go
through an extensive inspection process before they could be sold
on the Georgian market: Is the drug safe? Does it do what it is
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supposed to do? What are the side effects? Answering these questions
was − and still is − a very long and cumbersome process. It requires
sophisticated laboratories and well-trained, professionals to see it
through. However, if the drug in question is an internationally
approved pharmaceutical product, it will already have gone through
this process elsewhere, and the manufacturer will already have pro-
vided the answers to the relevant agencies in the respective countries.
So why do it again? The only question that remains is which coun-
tries can be trusted to be sufﬁciently meticulous to accept their
approval as reliable. In Georgia, the government decided that if a
drug is approved for use in the European Union, the United States,
Japan, Australia, or New Zealand, it would automatically also receive
approval for use in Georgia. This is because the Georgian authorities
realized that the respective agencies in those countries were better
equipped than their counterparts in Georgia, and that their experts
were much more experienced than their Georgian peers. The under-
lying assumption was that the relevant health authorities of these
countries would take good care to protect their citizens from unsafe
drugs, and that Georgia could, hence, trust their ruling.
Piggybacking on pre-existing foreign drug regulations signiﬁcantly
sped up the process of introducing and importing new drugs to
Georgia. It also increased the intensity of competition among manu-
facturers and helped break up the de facto oligopoly. Today, all drugs
that have already been approved in the European Union, the United
States, Japan, Australia, or New Zealand can be sold in Georgia (only
the relevant instructions need to be translated into Georgian language).
According to a recent study, the number of drugs registered increased
by 94 percent, and prices decreased by up to 30 percent, within one
year of the introduction of piggybacking in 2010: “We found consis-
tent evidence that the adoption of the approval and reporting regimes
had a statistically and quantitatively signiﬁcant downward effect on
drug prices in Georgia. [ . . . ] The regulatory reforms [ . . . ] in Georgia
must be counted as a success.”8 Today, Georgia is one of the ﬁrst
markets to which new drugs can be introduced once they are approved
either by health boards in the countries mentioned previously. Similar
approaches were applied to construction materials and other products
that require a high degree of technological sophistication, and a lot of
time, to check and approve.
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4.2.6 Regulatory Guillotine
In many countries, legacy regulation is substantial. Much of this reg-
ulation is out of date and doesn’t add value any longer. Yet it still
causes a lot of bureaucratic effort to enforce and oversee, and it
provides ofﬁcials with plenty of opportunity to make the lives of
citizens more difﬁcult than they should be, or would have to be. Yet
many governments have tried in vain to weed out superﬂuous regula-
tions. As soon as the government tries to get rid of such regulation,
some part of the administrative apparatus will advance an argument
why it is necessary to keep it. This is because complex regulation is a
job guarantee for civil servants. In fact, this is often the only purpose it
serves. The burden of proof is on the reformist government. But how
do you demonstrate to an army of veteran bureaucrats that the regula-
tion that they have spent decades developing, reﬁning, and defending
is not needed anymore?
This is exactly the predicament the Georgian government found itself in
after the Rose Revolution. We wanted to reduce the state’s regulatory
footprint to set the economy free. But every time we tried to eliminate
useless regulations, some agency or middle manager would protest and ask
us to prove that the new approach was better. In some cases we succeeded,
but in some we didn’t. The breakthrough came in 2005 when the govern-
ment turned the tables on the bureaucrats. We announced that all regula-
tion would be annulled in certain sectors − unless the relevant agencies
could prove within a certain period that a particular piece of regulation was
necessary to protect the health and safety of the population, and that the
regulation was actually used in practice, and for purposes other than
corruption. This approach, sometimes referred to as a “regulatory guillo-
tine,” helped us eliminate countless petty rules and reduce the number of
licenses and permits by 85 percent.
4.2.7 Sunset Clause Approach
The idea of the sunset clause approach is to attach an expiry date to those
rules and regulations that deal with a temporary issue in a particular
context. It is based on the experience that such regulation will eventually
become obsolete. According to this approach, regulation is automatically
revoked after a certain period of time – unless the government or relevant
authority expressly renews or prolongs it. In Georgia, this approach was
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never introduced. In retrospect, however, I believe it would have been
beneﬁcial to do so, because the sunset clause approach forces the admin-
istration to adjust and update rules and regulations continuously. What is
more, it allows the government to get rid of superﬂuous regulation
without any need for speciﬁc legislation or other procedures, such as
the regulatory guillotine described previously.
4.3 THOUGHTS ON THE WORLD BANK’S METHODOLOGY
Ofﬁcials everywhere are in the habit of doubting the methodology of the
World Bank’s “Doing Business” ranking. I have yet to meet a govern-
ment that doesn’t accuse the World Bank of misrepresenting the reality
of their country in its ranking. But in my experience, the World Bank is
almost always right. Those who doubt the methodology are usually
trying to blame the poor performance of their country on someone
else, often with the help of a few handpicked examples, many of which
are dubious or taken out of context. In reality, the World Bank does not
rank countries based on theoretical calculations or unrealistic assump-
tions, as many of its critics claim. Rather, it collects its information
mainly from private companies that have ﬁrsthand experience of the
public service in question. Indicators are derived from real-life data and
compared with the respective results in other countries to create the
ranking. Typically, the World Bank combines a de jure and a de facto
perspective:
• Are the written laws and regulations clear and straightforward?
• Are these laws and regulations actually applied in practice?
The World Bank will credit a country with improvements only if both
questions can reliably be answered in the afﬁrmative. For example,
Georgia formally introduced its electronic tax ﬁling system as early as
2009. The World Bank, however, did not reﬂect this reform in the
“Doing Business” report until 2011 because the majority of taxpayers
did not use the system in the preceding years (see the next chapter for
details). In another case, the World Bank did not – initially – credit
Georgia with the protection of minority investors. While the actual legal
practice was investor-friendly, the written laws were not. The question was
whether a minority shareholder suing a partner for wrongdoing could
obtain some speciﬁc information during the trial, and whether the plaintiff
4 CREATING A BUSINESS-FRIENDLY CLIMATE 89
needed to provide a detailed list of documents to obtain all relevant
information. In practice, all relevant information was made available to
the plaintiff upon request, even if the plaintiff did not name all the
documents individually. But the written law gave the courts the power
to refuse such a request. Only when we changed the law to conform with
the actual practice, clearly stating the obligation of the court to provide all
relevant information to the plaintiff, did the World Bank acknowledge the
practice. Another example of the same principle related to the enforce-
ment of contracts. The issue was whether a plaintiff could obtain pre-trial
attachment of a defendant’s movable assets if there was reason to believe
that the defendant might try to move these assets out of the court’s
jurisdiction. The practice was clear – it was possible. However, the written
law failed to specify some of the details of the process, which is why the
practice was not fully reﬂected in the World Bank’s report. Although many
readers may think that these examples are of minor importance, the ability
to rely on such regulations can make all the difference for small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
By and large, the regulatory burden a government puts on the economy
is well reﬂected by the World Bank’s reports. Of course, like any such
report, it cannot be 100 percent accurate. But I am convinced that it gives
a very good indication of a country’s business environment. The report
takes into account many of the practical factors that determine whether it
is sufﬁciently easy to do business for an existing local SME, or whether a
potential foreign investor will even consider entering a given market.
Examples include:
• How much money do you need to start a business?
• What does it cost to obtain a construction permit?
• How long does it take to register property?
In some of the countries I have visited as an advisor, it can take an investor
up to two years to get ready to start a company − registering the business,
getting a permit for the construction of a warehouse, registering property,
and getting connected to the nearest electricity grid. Representatives of
the World Bank collect all such information, mostly from private sector
players who have ﬁrst-hand experience of the procedures in question.
These companies know how long a given process actually takes, rather
than how long it is supposed to take, and how much it actually costs to get
a given permit, rather than how much it is supposed to cost, i.e., whether
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they have to pay a bribe to get it done. Such ﬁrst-hand information makes
the report a valuable source for everyone contemplating to do business in a
given country. In São Paolo, Brazil, for example, obtaining a construction
permit legally takes 425 days, on average. Indirectly, this kind of informa-
tion also serves as an indicator of potential corruption. If the legal process
takes 425 days, chances are that most investors will be willing to pay a
bribe to speed it up. Last, but not least, governments that have their
mindset on reforms can use the report as a roadmap to reduce the
regulatory burden and remove bureaucratic bottlenecks that hinder eco-
nomic growth.
In Georgia, there is a clear correlation between the “Doing Business”
ranking and actual business activity. As Georgia’s rank improved from
112th to 8th, the number of SMEs registered per year more than quad-
rupled in the period from 2004 to 2013.
The experience in other countries is similar, and empirical studies
conﬁrm that the “Doing Business” ranking correlates with actual eco-
nomic performance:
• High-ranked countries grow faster than lower-ranked countries. On
average, the countries in the top quartile of the report show 2.3
percent higher economic growth than those in the bottom quartile.9
• On average, each day of delay for exports and imports reduces inter-
national trade by 1 percent.10
• A 10 percent reduction in tax complexity is comparable to a 1 percent
reduction in effective corporate tax rates in terms of its effect on
foreign direct investment.11
• Cutting the number of procedures required to start a business in half
is associated with a 14 percent increase in the number of new busi-
ness registrations. A similar reduction of the number of days required
to register a business is linked to a 19 percent increase, while an
equivalent cut in the cost is associated with a 30 percent increase.12
None of these reforms is easy to pull off, but they are worth the effort. If
the political will is there, effective coordination is in place, and those
responsible have a good understanding of the topic, they can be pushed
through quickly, and to great public acclaim. For example, the introduc-
tion of public service halls in Georgia described previously was immen-
sely popular with citizens and gave the government credit to make other,
less popular changes that were necessary to get Georgia back on track.
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I encourage governments of developing countries everywhere to
embark on an ambitious journey to improve the local business climate
substantially and sustainably, as we have done in Georgia. If they
succeed, any respectable rating will show it.
4.4 “DOING BUSINESS” REFORMS IN KAZAKHSTAN
In April 2014, Karim Massimov was re-approved as prime minister of
Kazakhstan. We had both served as prime ministers of our countries
before, become friends, and both left ofﬁce in 2012. I gave him a call in
May 2014, a few weeks after he had been nominated again by the pre-
sident and was re-conﬁrmed as prime minister by the parliament.
“Congratulations, Mr. Prime Minister,” I said.
“Hello, Mr. Prime Minister. How have you been?”, he replied.
“Unlike you, Mr. Prime Minister, I am retired,” I said.
“Once a prime minister, always a prime minister. It’s one of those titles
that stay with you for life,” Karim insisted.
We both laughed.
“Listen, Nika, why don’t you come to Astana? It would be great to see you
again and catch up,” he said.
“Great. Will do. Again, congratulations!”
A few days later, we were having tea at his ofﬁce. Prime Minister told me
that Kazakhstan wanted to diversify its oil-based economy and accelerate its
business climate reforms. He also said that the government was determined
to initiate the necessary changes but that his team might need some help to
pull the right levers. It was a great opportunity for me to show that the
reforms described in this book were not only applicable to a small country
like Georgia, but to other, bigger countries like Kazakhstan as well.
“So what are you doing these days, Nika?” he asked.
“As it happens, I am writing a book about the reforms in Georgia. I also
advise some other governments in the region to help them apply the
lessons we learned in Georgia. And I have some ideas for great reforms
that we never got round to implementing in Georgia, but that other
countries might beneﬁt from.”
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“Listen, why don’t you help us with the ‘Doing Business’ reforms? We can
discuss some other reforms too, both those you made in Georgia and the
ones that you wanted to make in Georgia, but could not.”
“Sounds great,” I said.
“Why don’t you study our situation and come back with some new ideas
for reforms? We’ll take your advice, and then you can put the story in your
book. You can call the chapter ‘Reforms that I was not able to implement
in Georgia, but that were passed in Kazakhstan with the help of my friend,
the prime minister of Kazakhstan’.”
He had a big smile on his face. I loved his proposal. At the time, I had
just started my advisory ﬁrm and was looking for a reformist government
that had the political will to change. It would be a great opportunity to
put both the applicability of the reforms and my own capability as
an advisor to the test. Prime minister introduced to me his deputy,
Mr. Bakytzhan Sagintaev, saying that Bakytzhan would lead the reforms.
I sat down with Mr. Sagintayev and explained to him the Georgian
reforms, the methodology of the “Doing Business” report, and the
changes in legislation and regulation that we had introduced in
Georgia. I also spent some time describing the main obstacles that we
had had to overcome along the way.
“The biggest problem will be your own staff – deputy ministers, heads of
agencies, maybe even some ministers. Most of them won’t like the
reforms,” I said.
“This won’t be an issue. Our plan was approved at the highest level. We
will see this through. You tell me what it takes, and I will make it happen,”
he replied.
“Very well. Let’s stay in touch,” I said.
“Absolutely,” he conﬁrmed.
I said my goodbyes and headed to the airport.
A few days later deputy prime minister called me.
“Nika, I have met with the heads of agencies and deputy ministers who
would have to implement the reforms we discussed. I explained to them
what needs to be done. Guess what their response was.”
“I have a hunch that they didn’t like your agenda.”
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“They said ‘It’s impossible,’ exactly as you predicted.”
“I’m not surprised. There is an almost natural selection process that brings
people who treasure stability, and despise change, into these positions. If
you are a risk-taker, you start a business. If you prefer to play it safe, you
become a civil servant.”
“Let’s prove them wrong.”
“It will be my privilege.”
We worked together over the course of the next 2 years. More than 130
changes to laws, rules, and regulations were introduced in during the ﬁrst
year alone. In 2015 Kazakhstan was nominated as a number one reformer
worldwide for that year. The country jumped from 77th to 41st in the
”Doing Business” ranking from one year to the next. The World Bank
acknowledged 19 reforms in 7 areas out of the 10 that it monitors: starting
a business, dealingwith permits, registering property, getting credit, protect-
ing minority investors, enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency.13,14
Kazakhstan became the country that introduced the highest number of
reforms in any one year since the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business”
report was ﬁrst published. A year later Kazakhstan advanced to become 35th
in the ranking and this time 18 reforms in 7 areas were aknowledged by the
World Bank. Kazakhstan was also nominated as the second biggest reformer
of the year and among top three countries that made the most reforms since
2004 (after Georgia and Macedonia).
Thanks to these reforms, Kazakhstan is reducing its dependence on
oil, creating a structural advantage over its neighbors, and evolving into a
regional hub for trade and investment. More generally, Kazakhstan is a
good example of how one country can take inspiration from reforms
made in another country, even if the two countries are different in terms
of their economic development and geopolitical position, provided the
government is determined to create a more business-friendly environ-
ment and promote economic growth driven by private enterprise.
NOTES
1. http://data.worldbank.org/country/georgia (retrieved in June 2016).
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eu/countries/member-countries/index_de.htm (retrieved in June 2016).
3. Thanks to oil exports, Azerbaijan grew even faster than Georgia.
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4. See the description of special customs zones in the Chapter on “Reforming
Taxes and Customs.”
5. To this day, no other country has seen a bigger year-on-year improvement.
6. See http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/
UNECE/UNPAN019892.pdf (retrieved in May 2016).
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